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Incentivizing Blood Donation: Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis to
Test Titmuss’ Hypotheses
Claudia Niza
London School of Economics
Burcu Tung and Theresa M. Marteau
King’s College London
Objectives: Titmuss hypothesized that paying blood donors would reduce the quality of the blood
donated and would be economically inefficient. We report here the first systematic review to test these
hypotheses, reporting on both financial and nonfinancial incentives. Method: Studies deemed eligible for
inclusion were peer-reviewed, experimental studies that presented data on the quantity (as a proxy for
efficiency) and quality of blood donated in at least two groups: those donating blood when offered an
incentive, and those donating blood with no offer of an incentive. The following were searched:
MEDLINE, EMBASE and PsycINFO using OVID SP, CINAHL via EBSCO and CENTRAL, the
Cochrane Library, Econlit via EBSCO, JSTOR Health and General Science Collection, and Google.
Results: The initial search yielded 1100 abstracts, which resulted in 89 full papers being assessed for
eligibility, of which seven studies, reported in six papers, met the inclusion criteria. The included studies
involved 93,328 participants. Incentives had no impact on the likelihood of donation (OR 1.22 CI 95%
0.91–1.63; p  .19). There was no difference between financial and nonfinancial incentives in the
quantity of blood donated. Of the two studies that assessed quality of blood, one found no effect and the
other found an adverse effect from the offer of a free cholesterol test (  0.011 p  .05). Conclusion:
The limited evidence suggests that Titmuss’ hypothesis of the economic inefficiency of incentives is
correct. There is insufficient evidence to assess their likely impact on the quality of the blood provided.
Keywords: blood donation, incentives, motivational crowding-out, behavioral economics, policy
The Gift Relationship (1970) by Richard Titmuss is the seminal
work against paying for blood. This work draws on the contrast
between the U.S. blood supply system (mostly dependent on paid
donors) and that in the U.K. (based entirely on unpaid donors),
comparing the characteristics of blood donors, national statistics
for blood supply and demand, and surveys of donors’ motivations.
The book’s core premise is that altruistic blood donations are
superior to a commercial provision of blood on the grounds of
blood quality, economic efficiency, and moral value.
Titmuss’ prediction that payment would decrease blood quality
was based on numerous reports by U.S. doctors of blood obtained
from those with drug addictions and infectious diseases who
successfully concealed their condition. In a market context, blood
donors are motivated to withhold information about their health
status as this disclosure may affect the price offered for their blood
or even disqualify them as blood donors.
Contrary to common belief (e.g., Chmielewski, Bove, Lei, Neville,
& Nagpal, 2012; Mellström & Johannesson, 2008), Titmuss did not
predict that blood quantity would decrease if incentives were intro-
duced. He did, however, consider the economic efficiency of paying
for blood and the cost per unit of blood, which he claimed was higher
in countries that paid donors because of a higher waste of blood and
administrative costs. Blood quantity can be taken as a proxy for
efficiency because, given the same amount of blood, the cost per unit
from a paid source is higher than that from an unpaid source. In our
review we will take the likelihood of donation as a proxy for eco-
nomic efficiency of incentivized donations.
These arguments raised a heated discussion, particularly among
economists, with criticism of Titmuss for his narrow view of
market forces and lack of empirical support (Arrow, 1972; Solow,
1971). Proponents of the free-market for blood supply formulated
the hypothesis that paying donors for blood would increase supply,
based on earlier analyses (Cooper & Culyer, 1968).
But most importantly for Titmuss—and the most well-known
feature of his work—is his defense of the superior moral value of
altruistic blood donations compared with paid donations. He ar-
gued that decreasing the opportunity for altruistic donations with
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the offer of payment could have unpredictable negative conse-
quences by limiting people’s freedom to give out of regard for the
needs of others. Although this assumption was not based on
empirical evidence, he presented survey data suggesting the neg-
ative impact of incentives in the former Soviet Union showing that
after incentives were introduced, only 72% of donors reported they
would keep donating if payments were withdrawn and only 50% of
donors would donate as often as they currently did.
Despite the paucity of evidence, Titmuss’ manifesto for altru-
istic blood donation marked the start of discussions about perverse
effects of incentivizing behavior that became known as motiva-
tional crowding-out (Promberger & Marteau, this issue). Motiva-
tional crowding-out is the umbrella term used in economics for the
reverse of the relative price effect in economic theory, that is,
when higher incentives lead to lower (not higher) supply (Bénabou
& Tirole, 2006; Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Kreps, 1997).
Intrinsic motivation can be negatively affected when an external
reward is offered, for example by changing the way the situation
is perceived or by changing the individual’s self-perception as
being controlled by the reward (Frey & Jegen, 2001). Evidence for
motivational crowding-out in economics became the reduced sup-
ply once incentives are introduced.
There is also a large literature in psychology about the under-
mining effect of rewards on intrinsic motivation, developed shortly
after Titmuss (Deci, 1975). This tradition, however, analyzes mo-
tivational crowding-out once incentives are removed. To our
knowledge, no studies on blood donation provide data on the
likelihood of donating after incentives are withdrawn. We there-
fore assessed motivational crowding-out in this review as defined
in economic theory by considering changes in the blood supplied
in the presence of incentives.
Titmuss’ work has influenced blood acquisition policies on a
global level. The World Health Assembly (WHA) passed the
resolution WHA 28.72 in 1975 urging member states to develop
blood systems based on voluntary non-remunerated donation of
blood. In 1997, the World Health Organization (WHO) recom-
mended that all blood donations should come from unpaid volun-
tary donors. However, by 2006, only 49 of 124 countries surveyed
had established this as a standard. The WHO reiterated their
position in 2009 with the Melbourne Declaration on 100% Vol-
untary Non–remunerated Donation of Blood and Blood Compo-
nents with the statement that “paid donation can compromise the
establishment of sustainable blood collection from voluntary non-
remunerated blood donors” (World Health Organization, 2009, p. 2).
Policies do, however, still differ across jurisdictions and regions. In
the United States, blood is donated through various organizations
registered with the U.S. Blood Bank, including blood centers, the Red
Cross and hospitals, with some providing financial incentives to
encourage donation (Domen, 1995). Financial incentives are most
often used in the context of plasma donation, with concerns about the
expected poorer quality of incentivized donations being abated by the
use of technologies that can destroy viruses during the process of
separating the blood from its plasma. In the U.K., the blood supply is
managed through NHS Blood and Transplant, with blood only taken
from unpaid voluntary donors, although there is a donor award
scheme that introduces various gifts with respect to the amount of
blood being donated. Paid donors remain major blood suppliers in
some European countries, including Germany (Kretschmer,
Weippert-Kretschmer, Slonka, Karger, & Zeiler, 2004).
The widespread idea that paying for blood could have unpre-
dictable negative consequences raises the question of what consti-
tutes payment and where a distinction may lie between financial
incentives, such as cash or lotteries, and nonfinancial incentives,
such as t-shirts, mugs, and medical tests. The former tends to raise
more opposition, whereas the latter is more commonly accepted as
a legitimate way to incentivize blood donation. Two observational
studies claim that these nonfinancial incentives can be more ef-
fective than monetary payments to increase blood donation. In a
survey of 467 blood donors in an Italian town, Lacetera and Macis
(2010) found that donors reported they would stop being donors if
given 10 Euros in cash, but not if a voucher of the same nominal
value was offered instead. Costa-i-Font and colleagues (Costa-i-
Font, Jofre-Bonet, & Yen, 2011) analyzed attitudes toward pay-
ment for blood in large representative samples of 15 European
countries and concluded that those in favor of paid donations were
less likely to have donated blood, whereas those favoring nonmon-
etary rewards were equally or more likely to be donors. In our
work, we will include both types of incentives to test this claim.
Two reviews have considered the impact of incentives on the
likelihood of giving blood (Godin, Vézina-Im, Bélanger-Gravel, &
Amireault, 2012; Goette, Stutzer, & Frey, 2010). One is an unsys-
tematic, narrative review of the literature that includes both obser-
vational and experimental studies (Goette et al., 2010). The authors
conclude that incentives work relatively well in increasing blood
supply. The other review was more systematic and focused on
experimental studies of a range of interventions of which incen-
tives were just one (Godin et al., 2012). Only two studies on
incentives were included in this review (Ferrari, Barone, Jason, &
Rose, 1985; Jason, Jackson, & Obradovic, 1986). From these two
studies, the authors concluded it was not possible to make any
claim about the impact of incentives.
Regarding blood quality, there are two reviews strictly based on
observational studies that reported a higher prevalence of transfusion-
transmissible viruses in blood acquired from paid donors (Eastlund,
1998; van Der Poel, Seifried, & Schaasberg, 2002). In keeping with
these findings, a more recent study from Lithuania assessing both
regular and first-time whole blood donors found that blood from
first-time paid donors was of poorer quality (Kalibatas, 2008).
Our review aims to provide the first formal synthesis of evi-
dence to assess the impact of offering financial incentives upon the
quantity and quality of blood obtained.
Method
We used the Cochrane Review handbook to guide the methods
used in this review (Higgins & Green, 2011).
Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria
The inclusion criteria were (a) published randomized studies in
which participants in one group were offered an incentive for blood
donation and in another group were not, and (b) that reported data on
one or both of two outcomes: the proportion of people providing
blood, and the quality of the blood provided. Incentives were defined
as a good or service with a monetary value offered in exchange for
blood. These could be described as compensation for resources spent
in donation (most usually time) or as an explicit motivator. We
excluded exchanges of little or no monetary value such as certificates
or badges.
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Data Sources and Searches
We searched MEDLINE (1950 to December 2011), EMBASE
(1980 to December 2011), and PsycINFO (1985 to December
2011) using OVID SP, and CINAHL (1982 to December 2011) via
EBSCO. The search strategies used both keywords and medical
subject headings. We searched for relevant systematic reviews in
the Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials (CENTRAL,
the Cochrane Library, December 2011) as well as the OVID SP
databases (1985 to December 2011), EconLit via EBSCO (1996 to
December 2011), JSTOR Health and General Science Collection
(1886 to December 2011 in Economics), and Google, using terms
related to incentives and blood donation.
The initial search yielded 1100 abstracts (see Appendix A), which
resulted in 89 full papers being assessed for eligibility. The large
number of papers excluded at the screening stage was mostly a result
of the retrieval of clinical trials that assessed quality of blood retrieved
but not following the offer of incentives. Six papers, reporting seven
studies between them, met the eligibility criteria for our review (see
Figure 1). Of these, two studies did not report data in a form that could
be extracted for meta-analysis (Goette & Stutzer, 2008; Goette,
Stutzer, Yavuzcan, & Frey, 2009 Study 2). Requests to the authors for
the data in an extractable form were unsuccessful.
Data Extraction and Quality Assessment
Two review authors prescreened all search results (titles and
abstracts) against the selection criteria for possible inclusion, and
those selected by both review authors were subjected to a full-text
assessment. Two review authors independently assessed the se-
lected full-text articles for inclusion, resolving any discrepancies
Figure 1. Study selection.
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by consensus. Variables of interest included study participants,
study design, incentive, outcome measure, and results.
Risk of bias was assessed by two authors in accordance with the
guidelines of the Cochrane Consumers and Communication Re-
view Group (Higgins & Green, 2011), which recommends the
explicit reporting of individual elements that affect risk of bias,
including:
1. Sequence generation: classified as adequate if carried out
using true randomization and not quasi-randomization,
such as by day of week, date of birth, or sequence;
2. Allocation concealment: classified as adequate if alloca-
tion is concealed from the purveyor of risk information,
researchers, and the participant at least until the point of
allocation to groups;
3. Blinding: classified as adequate if participants, person-
nel, and outcome assessors are blind to allocation.
4. Incomplete outcome data: classified as adequate if attri-
tion data are clearly reported and there is no evidence of
differential drop out in the intervention and control
groups;
5. Selective outcome reporting: classified as adequate if
data are provided for all outcomes specified in the study
protocol, or where this may be unavailable, in the meth-
ods section;
6. Other sources of bias, including baseline comparability:
classified as adequate if groups are comparable at base-
line or any differences at baseline are adjusted for in the
primary analysis; and validation of measures, classified
as adequate if there is evidence of reliability and validity
reported in the study or published elsewhere.
Data Synthesis and Analysis
Three studies that were presented in two papers reported out-
comes from more than one incentive condition (Lacetera, Macis, &
Slonim, 2012; Mellström & Johannesson, 2008). Because these
observations are not independent, the results from only one incen-
tive condition per study are included in the meta-analysis. For
Mellström and Johannesson (2008) we include the results from the
offer of the fixed incentive (and not the offer of a choice between
an incentive and a donation to charity), thus making the interven-
tion more comparable with other interventions in the review. In
Lacetera et al. (2012), three sizes of incentive were offered ($5,
$10, $15), and we performed separate analyses to independently
include each incentive size.
The effect size is reported using odds ratios (OR), with an OR
greater than one favoring the intervention group. We obtained
pooled effect sizes with 95% confidence intervals using a random
effects model.
Results
Of the seven included studies (see Table 1), three were conducted
in the United States, three in Switzerland, and one in Sweden. Four
involved previous donors, two involved previous non-donors, and one
comprised both types of donors. The financial incentives that were
offered included money, lottery tickets, and cholesterol tests, with an
estimated value of between $3 and $15 each.
The seven studies involved 93,328 participants with an age
range from under 20 to 65. The gender mix among participants
ranged from 39% to 60% women.
Quantity of Blood Provided
The seven included studies assessed the impact on the likelihood of
donating following the offer of a financial incentive. However, it was
only possible to pool data from five of the seven studies. In Lacetera
et al. (2012) the authors compared four conditions: (a) advertised
reward and informed, (b) advertised and uninformed, (c) surprise
reward, and (d) no reward. We could not access the raw data for the
control group, so the comparison presented is between (c) surprise
reward and (a) advertised and informed reward. The former acted as
a control because, although there was the offer of an incentive,
participants were unaware of this and therefore their behavior cannot
be attributed to the incentive. The raw data are not presented in the
paper but were kindly provided to us by the authors.
In the five studies included in the meta-analysis (see Figure 2),
the likelihood of blood donation was similar when financial in-
centives were offered and when they were not (OR 1.22 95% CI
0.91–1.63 p  .19). This estimate was calculated using the data
from Lacetera et al. (2012) for the $5 incentive but it holds for the
other two higher incentive sizes: $10 (OR  1.33 95% CI 0.94–
1.89 p  .11) and $15 (OR  1.85 95% CI 0.83–4.11 p  .13).
There was no significant evidence of between-study heterogeneity
with 2  9.19 p  .056 and no sign of small-study effects with
Egger’s test  1.51 p  .132. Begg’s test was not significant (z 
.98 p  .327), suggesting an absence of publication bias. Study
estimates show no pattern by publication year.
In both the studies that could not be included in the meta-
analysis, individuals in the experimental groups were offered a free
cholesterol test as an incentive, which had no impact on the
likelihood of providing blood in either study (Goette & Stutzer,
2008; Goette et al., 2009 Study 2). In one study (Goette et al.,
2009) a lottery was offered to a second experimental group. This
had no main effect but among donors with a previous low rate of
donation, it increased the likelihood of donation (by an estimated
9%), with no impact on those with previously high rates of
donation.
Subgroup Analyses
Based on very small subgroup analyses, none of the incentive
types seemed to be effective: cash OR  1.14, p  .67, 95% CI
0.63–2.07 (n  1), vouchers OR  2.13, p  .11, 95% CI 0.85–5.31
(n  2), and gifts OR  0.99, p  .92, 95% CI 0.89–1.12 (n  2).
Further analyses similarly showed no difference when participants
were previous non-donors (OR  1.16, p  .58) or when they
were previous donors (OR  1.06, p  .57).
Quality of Material Provided
Two studies assessed the impact of offering financial incentives to
existing donors on the quality of blood provided as indicated by the
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rejection rate (Goette & Stutzer, 2008; Lacetera et al., 2012). Lacetera
et al. (2012) reported that incentives (gift cards) did not change the
proportions of rejected donations, which were 0.12% and 0.14% in
the advertised and non-advertised sites, respectively. Goette and
Stutzer (2008) found no effect on quality of donations following the
offer of a lottery ticket but the offer of a cholesterol test increased the
proportion of donations rejected (  0.011, p  .05).
Assessment of Risk of Bias
Table 2 presents the assessment of risk of bias for included
studies. The pattern of findings suggests a moderate risk of bias
from a failure in any study to specify methods of randomization,
and those assessing outcomes not being blind to group allocation.
All studies had adequate presentation of outcome data (despite two
being excluded from meta-analysis because they did not present
outcome data in ways that allowed them to be used), and there was
no evidence of selective reporting or other noticeable sources of
bias.
Discussion
From the few studies that met the eligibility criteria, we found
no impact of offering financial incentives on the quantity of blood
given. With respect to blood quality, only two studies met the
inclusion criteria. One study reported no impact of a gift card on
the quality of blood provided. The other study reported poorer
quality donations when the incentive offered was a medical test but
not when the incentive was a lottery ticket. There was no evidence
of motivational crowding-out if operationalized as a lower blood
supply when incentives are offered.
The strength of this review is that it is the first to our knowledge
that attempts to examine the evidence for Titmuss’ influential hypoth-
eses concerning the adverse effects of using incentives to encourage
Table 1
Characteristics of Included Studies
Authors Country Participants and setting Type of donor
Groups
Control group Incentive group
Ferrari et al.
(1985)
US Posters and bulletins
posted around a US
University campus
with announcement
about time and place
of blood donation
Both first-time and
previous donors
n  31
Peer altruism.
Students were
informed that their
peers would be
donating blood
n  49
Offer of coupons redeemable at
local merchants for free or
reduced-price merchandise
and a raffle (tickets to
Broadway play, college
football game)
Reich et al.
(2006)
US Blood Centers in San
Francisco and
Arizona; Outcome
second and third
donations of first-
time donors within 6
months
Previous donors n  3,441 n  3,478
Offer of a t-shirt
Mellström &
Johannesson
(2008)
Sweden Regional Blood Centre
Gothenburg Sweden;
Primary outcome
health check for
blood donation
First-time donors n  89 n  85
Offer of $7
n  88
Choice between $7 and
donation to charity
Goette & Stutzer
(2008)
Switzerland Zurich Blood Donation
Service of the Swiss
Red Cross;
individuals
registered in the
database invited to
donate blood again
Previous donors n  2,950 n  4,431
Offer of a free cholesterol test
n  1205
Offer of a lottery ticket from
Swiss State Lottery
Goette et al.
(2009) Study 1
Switzerland Zurich Blood Donation
Service of the Swiss
Red Cross
First-time donors n  725 n  1,400
Offer of a free cholesterol test
Goette et al.
(2009) Study 2
Switzerland Zurich Blood Donation
Service of the Swiss
Red Cross 8269
previous donors
Previous donors n  1,968 n  3,812
Offer of a free cholesterol test
Lacetera et al.
(2012)
US The American Red
Cross (ARC)
conducted 14,029
blood drives in US
northern Ohio
between May 2006
and October 2008
Previous donors $5 n  10,846
$10 n  12,515
$15 n  12,607
Total n  35,968
$5 n  17,847
$10 n  15,849
$15 n  12,738
Total n  46,434
The different amounts refer to
gift cards redeemable for
food, gasoline and general
merchandise.
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blood donation. We have revealed the paucity of experimental evi-
dence, as well as different conclusions to earlier, unsystematic re-
views. In contrast to the unsystematic narrative review by Goette et al.
(2010), based on a mixture of observational and experimental studies,
the results of our more robust review do not corroborate their con-
clusions that incentives increase blood donation. Using more robust
search methods compared with Godin et al. (2012), our review is
based on a larger number of studies, allowing us to draw some
conclusions.
The studies were heterogeneous both in terms of the interventions
and the populations studied. The incentives offered included t-shirts,
cholesterol tests, money, gift cards, and lottery tickets, and their value
varied from $3 to $15, studied in populations from different countries.
Nevertheless, there was no evidence of statistical between-study het-
erogeneity, which suggests that the overall estimate was robust.
The small number of included studies limited the meaningful-
ness of subgroup analyses to explore the impact of several poten-
tial effect modifiers. Previous blood donation could be an impor-
tant moderator of incentive effects although our analyses showed
no differences between first-time and previous donors. Two sur-
veys (Costa-i-Font et al., 2011; Lacetera & Macis, 2010) claimed
that nonmonetary incentives would be more effective than mone-
tary payments to increase blood donation. Our results showed that
none of the types was effective, although the pattern of findings
suggested that vouchers may be more effective. Mellström and
Johannesson (2008) identified a post hoc gender effect (significant
crowding-out effect in women and no effect on men), but this
result was not replicated in other studies with more power.
It could be argued that the size of the incentives offered was not
sufficient to motivate behavior. However, there is considerable evi-
dence that very small incentives can change behavior in other health
domains including disease screening and medical adherence
(e.g.,Helmus, Saules, Schoener, & Roll, 2003; Malotte, Rhodes, &
Mais, 1998; Tulsky et al., 2000; Volpp et al., 2008), suggesting that
blood donation may be more resistant to the impact of incentives.
Some methodological limitations and their consequent risk of
bias in the included studies should to be taken into account when
drawing any conclusions from this review. The assessment of risk
of bias suggested a moderate risk from lack of detail both in the
methods of randomization, and blindness of outcome assessors to
group allocation. All but two of the studies were powered to detect
small effects of incentives, with the exception of Ferrari et al.
(1985) and Mellström and Johannesson (2008).
Implications for Practice and Research
We found support for Titmuss’ hypothesis that incentives are
economically inefficient: offering incentives did not increase the
quantity of the blood donated and introduced additional costs. The
fact that incentives had no impact on the quantity of blood, as
would be predicted by the price effect in classical economic
theory, is one reason against its use in practice. Titmuss’ concerns
about blood quality were mostly related to previous non-donors
and how the offer of incentives could decrease blood quality by
attracting more at-risk donors. The two studies that reported on
blood quality both involved previous donors, thus providing at best
a partial test of this hypothesis.
The empirical tests of Titmuss’ hypotheses, however, are not the
only considerations. Moral judgments that are not about the readily
measurable consequences also play a part. Titmuss’ arguments
against the use of incentives in blood donation had deep roots in
his humanist conception of social policy as a tool for human
progress that should be protected from what he considered to be
exploitative economic interests. He endorsed blood donation as a
core example of how society should be governed by relationships
characterized by reciprocity. Regardless of the effectiveness of
incentives to increase blood stocks, paid donors become blood
sellers and blood donation becomes blood supply. Two recent
analyses of the role of money markets for human blood (Healy,
2006) and beyond (Sandel, 2012) share this perspective, reflecting
“protected values” (Baron & Spranca, 1997) or “sacred values”
(Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000), echoed in the
widely held view that some human exchanges should not be traded
off against money. The insight provided by the few studies in-
cluded in this review is limited not only in quantity but also by
quality, as reflected in study designs. Uncertainty would be re-
duced by additional experimental studies in which the size and
type of incentives were varied, in first-time and previous donors.
We found no support for motivational crowding-out, operational-
ized as a decrease in blood supply in the presence of incentives. It
remains unknown, however, whether incentives had some crowding
out effect on who donated rather than how many donated. For exam-
Figure 2. Impact of financial incentives upon likelihood of providing blood.
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ple, incentives may have distanced voluntary donors and attracted
new, incentive-driven donors without affecting the overall number of
donors. The longer-term outcomes of incentivizing need also to be
studied. We found no studies that assessed the impact of incentivizing
on subsequent likelihood of donating when incentives were not of-
fered.
The extent to which incentives that are larger than those in-
cluded in this review would effectively increase blood donation
remains unknown. Also unknown is the cost-effectiveness of
larger incentives.
In conclusion, the limited evidence suggests that Titmuss’ hy-
pothesis of the economic inefficiency of incentives may be correct.
There is insufficient evidence to assess their likely impact on the
quality of the blood provided.
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